Abstract-This letter considers the physical layer security of a pilot-based massive multiple-input multiple-output (MaMIMO) system in presence of a multi-antenna jammer. We propose a new jamming detection method that makes use of a generalized likelihood ratio test over some coherence blocks. Our proposed method utilizes intentionally unused pilots in the network. The performance of the proposed detector improves by increasing the number of antennas at the base station, the number of unused pilots and also by the number of the coherence blocks that are utilized. Simulation results show that in the MaMIMO regime, perfect detection is achievable even with a small number of unused pilots.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
ASSIVE multiple-input multiple-output (MaMIMO) technology provides improvements of the physical layer security against passive eavesdropping [1] . To cause more harm, the eavesdropper can decide to actively attack the legitimate system. The asymptotic secrecy rate for downlink MaMIMO systems is derived in [2] in the presence of an active multi-antenna eavesdropper. Furthermore, for detection of an active eavesdropper, Kapetanović et al. [3] propose a detection method based on random training. Detection methods based on cooperation between the base station (BS) and the legitimate user are also suggested in [4] . A jammer can be viewed as an active eavesdropper, which transmits jamming signals in both the pilot and data phases. In MaMIMO systems, by jamming the pilot phase, pilot contamination is caused which significantly decreases the spectral efficiency (SE) of the legitimate users. Vinogradova et al. [5] propose a jamming detection and countermeasure scheme for MaMIMO systems based on random matrix theory. Do et al. [6] propose a linear combining scheme that exploits unused pilots to improve the SE of the MaMIMO systems in presence of a single-antenna jammer. In [7] , a jamming power allocation scheme is investigated for MaMIMO systems, where a smart jammer aims to maximize its deterioration effect on the SE of the legitimate system.
In order to apply the known methods for combating jamming, we first need to detect the presence of the jammer. In this letter, we propose a new jamming detection method by exploiting a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) in the MaMIMO systems. Our proposed detector utilizes the key properties of MaMIMO systems, i.e., many antennas at the BS and the use of uplink pilot transmission. To this end, the detector estimates the power of the multi-antenna jammer in some intentionally unused pilot sequences (i.e., the pilots that are not assigned to any active users, except during peak hours) over multiple coherence blocks. To evaluate performance of the proposed method, we derive closed-form expressions for the false alarm and correct detection probabilities. Our analysis shows that the jamming detection improves by increasing the number of antennas at the BS as well as the number of unused pilots. Simulation results show that in systems with a large number of BS antennas, perfect detection (i.e., correct detection probability is one) is achievable even with a small number of unused pilots.
II. PROBLEM SETUP We present the system model and the jammer's strategy to attack the legitimate system in the pilot phase.
A. System Model
Consider the uplink of a single-cell multi-user MIMO system with one M r -antenna BS and K legitimate single-antenna users. There is an M w -antenna jammer in the network that aims to reduce the asymptotic SE of the legitimate system. Each channel is modeled as Rayleigh block-fading, where it is constant within a coherence block of T samples and has independent realizations between the blocks. Let τ (τ ≤ T) be the number of samples during a block spent on transmission of pilots for channel estimation. {φ 1 , . . . , φ τ } is the set of τ orthonormal pilot sequences, in which φ i ∈ C τ ×1 is the ith pilot and φ
∈ C M r ×M w the channels from the ith legitimate user and the jammer to the BS in the lth block, respectively, which are defined by
The scalars β i , β w are the positive large-scale fading coefficients and h i (l), h ( j) w (l) represent fast fading in the lth block, which have independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) CN (0, 1) elements. Since the large-scale fading varies much slower than the fast fading, we assume that β i , β w remain constant in L coherence blocks which are distributed over the frequency domain and also over time.
In the pilot phase of the lth block, the users send their respective pilots φ i (l), i = 1, . . . , K to the BS. At the same time, the jammer transmits its jamming signals ψ
. . , M w to create pilot contamination that later will degrade the asymptotic SE of the legitimate system. We study a single-cell scenario, which is not too different from a practical multi-cell scenario, where a pilot reuse factor of 3, 4, or 7 is used [8, Ch. 6] . Thus, the interference that comes from pilot reuse in other cells in the pilot phase is ignored (although, the interference in the data phase might be large). The received signal at the BS for a given block l ∈ {1, . . . , L} is modeled as
where p and q represent the transmit powers of the users and each antenna of the jammer in the pilot phase, respectively.
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The matrix
is the jamming precoder (which is independent of the channels) composed of the vectors v 
B. Jammer's Strategy
The jammer aims to maximize its negative impact on the legitimate system. Since one of the main advantages of MaMIMO is achieving high SE, a natural strategy that can be adopted by the jammer is to reduce the asymptotic SE of the legitimate system. To analyze the worst-case impact of the jamming, we assume that the jammer is smart and knows the transmission protocol and the pilot set {φ 1 , . . . , φ τ }. The jammer can obtain this information by listening to the channel for some consecutive blocks. The jamming signals ψ ( j) w (l) in (1) can be generally written as a combination of the orthonormal pilots as
where α
Utilizing (3), the power constraint on the jamming signals is
Lemma 1 (Asymptotic SE): In a multi-user MIMO system by utilizing the minimum mean-squared error estimate in the pilot phase and the maximum ratio combiner in the data phase as well as for any jamming precoder in the data phase that follows the power constraint on the transmitted jamming signals, the asymptotic SE is defined by E{C (asy) (l)} where 1
(5) ρ and represent the average transmit powers of the users and each antenna of the jammer in the data phase, respectively. The necessary condition for (5) is
Proof: Lemma 1 is derived analogously to the analysis presented in [7, Sec. II] , which is omitted here due to space.
The number of pilots is fixed in practice, while the number of users vary and is usually below the peak value [9] . Hence, there are generally τ − K ≥ 1 unused pilots in the network which can be exploited to improve the security of the network. To this end, we assume that the BS uses a pseudo-random pilot hopping technique to assign the pilots randomly to the users [9] . This technique prevents the jammer from estimating which pilots are assigned to the users. 1 We use the notation
Remark 1 (Jammer's Best Strategy): In general, the jammer's strategy depends on its objective and available information. As we said before, here the jammer aims to prevent the asymptotic SE in (5) from unlimitedly increasing. If at least one of
This means that the jammer will not successfully limit the asymptotic SE of the MaMIMO systems, if it does not attack all users. Furthermore, the jammer does not know the current assigned pilot to each user. Hence, the best strategy that it can adopt, is to divide its power equally over all pilots, i.e.,
From this strategy and the power constraint in (4), we have
C. Utilization of Unused Pilots
By substituting the definition of the matrix w (l) in (1) and using (3), the received signal at the BS can be rewritten as
For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, it is assumed in (8) that the first K pilots of the pilot set are assigned to the users and the remaining pilots are unused, i.e.,
Since the signal received along each unused pilot includes only the jamming signals and noise, we exploit it to detect the jamming attack. By projecting Y(l) on each of the unused pilots, we have 
The hypotheses H 0 and H 1 respectively denote the absence and presence of the jammer. The vectors g 
Since the rows of Y w (l) are independent from each other and also from the elements of Y w (l ) for l = l , we have
Considering (10), the likelihood function under H 0 is obtained by settingq = 0 in (12). Hence, we have
Since in (12),q is an unknown parameter, we exploit the GLRT [10] to decide which hypothesis is true. This enables us to detect the jamming. The detector is given by
where μ is a threshold parameter for detecting the presence of the jammer. In order to implement the test in (14), the BS estimatesq by utilizing maximum likelihood (ML) estimation [11] under H 1 . An equivalent expression for (12) is obtained as (15), shown at the bottom of this page. The ML estimation ofq is performed by maximizing the log-likelihood function. Hence, it is obtained by differentiating (15) with respect toq and solving the following equation
Therefore, the ML estimate ofq, which is denoted byq, iŝ
Replacingq in (14) by its ML estimate from (17), the test is calculated in logarithmic form as
Some manipulations of the above inequality lead to
Sinceq must be nonnegative, the negative values ofq in (17) are ignored and replaced byq = 0. By defining a monotonically increasing function J (x)
x ≥ 0 and using (19), we have
or equivalentlŷ
Therefore, we can define a positive threshold μ and comparễ q ≷
μ for detecting the jamming attacks.
A. False Alarm Probability
When the jammer is not present in the network but the BS detects its presence by mistake, a "false alarm" will occur. The false alarm probability is defined as P FA Pr(q > μ ; H 0 ).
Theorem 1:
In MaMIMO systems, the false alarm probability of the proposed jamming detector is
where (·) and γ (·, ·) are the gamma and lower incomplete gamma functions, respectively. The false alarm probability in (22) asymptotically behaves as
when M r → ∞. The notation Q(·) represents the Q-function.
Proof:
with 2M r L degrees of freedom. Hence, we can obtain the P FA
The variable r converges in distribution to a Gaussian r.v. as the number of degrees of freedom tends to infinity. Therefore, q converges in probability to
). The false alarm probability is a criterion to choose an appropriate value for μ . For the chosen μ , we obtain the correct detection probability in next subsection.
B. Correct Detection Probability
If the BS successfully detects the presence of the jammer, a "correct detection" will occur and its probability is defined as P C Pr(q > μ ; H 1 ).
Theorem 2:
In MaMIMO systems, the correct detection probability of the proposed jamming detector is
which asymptotically behaves as when M r → ∞. Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 1, except that under
Sinceq ≥ 0 and provided thatq > μ , from (26), we see that the correct detection probability of the proposed detector increases by increasing the number of BS antennas. In particular, P C → 1 and P FA → 0 as M r → ∞.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the behavior of the proposed jamming detector. It is assumed that M w = 4, β w = 1, τ = 10 and also the number of independent runs for Monte Carlo simulations is 10 5 . We select the matrices V w (l) and w (l) so that the constraint in (7) is satisfied. Fig. 1 shows how the correct detection probability depends on the number of antennas, unused pilots, and coherence blocks that the detection is performed over, simulated under P FA = 0.01 and q = −17 dB. 2 The curves are plotted for two different number of users K ∈ {6, 4} (leading to the number of unused pilots τ − K ∈ {4, 6}) and two different number of the coherence blocks L ∈ {1, 10}. It can be seen that by increasing the number of BS antennas as well as the number of the coherence blocks, the correct detection probability improves. We see that nearly perfect detection can be achieved, for example, by utilizing six unused pilots and M r = 200 antennas for L = 1. Similarly, for M r = 20 and L = 10, the number of required unused pilots for achieving perfect detection is set to six. However, for M r = 50 and L = 10, perfect detection is achieved with only four unused pilots.
In Fig. 2 , the correct detection probability of the proposed detector is depicted versus the false alarm probability for different values of the jammer's transmission power. It is assumed M r = 100, L = 10 and there are two unused pilot sequences in the network (K = 8). Moreover, when the value of μ is lower than zero, nullifying the negative values ofq leads to both the false alarm and correct detection probabilities become one. According to (23), μ < 0 for P FA > 0.5. Hence, the correct detection probability is plotted only for P FA ∈ [0, 0.5]. It can be seen in Fig. 2 that the correct detection probability improves by increasing the jammer's transmit power. In addition, all the curves are above the line P C = P FA , even for low power at the jammer. Hence, the proposed detector behaves very well in MaMIMO systems. Furthermore, this simulation confirms our asymptotic analyses as M r → ∞, presented in the previous section.
V. CONCLUSION In this letter, a new jamming detector was proposed based on a GLRT to improve the security of MaMIMO networks. The proposed detector uses the unused pilots to estimate the received power of the multi-antenna jammer over multiple coherence blocks. Our analysis shows that the proposed detector works well in MaMIMO systems and it can be further enhanced by increasing the number of BS antennas, unused pilots, and also the coherence blocks that the detection is performed over. While prior works have proposed methods to mitigate jamming in MaMIMO, in practice, our detector can be used as a first step to determine if there exists any jamming that the legitimate system needs to mitigate.
